Introduction
The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) 1 covering England and Wales, provides a statutory framework for people who lack capacity to make decisions for themselves, or who have capacity and want to make preparations for a time when they may lack capacity in the future. It sets out who can take decisions, in which situations and how they should go about this. The Act came into force during 2007 and applies to everyone 'habitually resident or present in England and Wales. ' The MCA has five key principles which emphasise the fundamental concepts and core values of the MCA. These must always be considered when working with or providing care or treatment for people who lack capacity. 1. Every adult has the right to make his or her own decisions and must be assumed to have capacity to do so unless it is proved otherwise. Thus you cannot assume that someone is unable to make a decision for themselves just because they have a particular medical condition or disability. 2. People must be supported as much as possible to make a decision before anyone concludes that they cannot make their own decision. This means that you should make every effort to encourage and support the person to make the decision for themselves. 3. People have the right to make what others might regard as unwise or eccentric decisions. Everyone has their own values, beliefs and preferences which may not be the same as those of other people. 4. Anything done for or on behalf of a person who lacks mental capacity must be done in their best interests. 5. Before the act is done, or the decision made, regard must be taken as to whether the purpose for which it is needed can be as effectively achieved in a way that is less restrictive of the person' s rights and freedom of action. Essentially, the MCA codifies what is deemed to be best practice. However, there are several new concepts and services which have an impact on how we treat patients who lack capacity to make decisions within the critical care setting. The following key areas of the MCA will be discussed in this paper: 
Making decisions on care and treatment
The MCA clearly states that every adult has the right to make his or her own decision and unless proven otherwise:
'A person must be assumed to have capacity unless it is established that he lacks capacity'. ( 
MCA section 1(2))
All decisions about capacity must be based on this premise, and every effort must be made to establish whether a person has decision-making capacity. In some contexts it may be clear that a critically ill patient lacks capacity to make a decision: eg a low Glasgow Coma Score (GCS) in severe head injury, or sedation and neuromuscular blockade to facilitate management of severe ventilatory failure. Where a lack of capacity is obvious, no further assessment may be needed, but this fact should be recorded in the notes. However, in circumstances where the issue of capacity is not as clear, a formal assessment of capacity must be undertaken and documented, even if the conclusion is that capacity is absent. Thus, the agitated patient who is recovering from head injury may have a higher GCS, but a careful assessment may still show that capacity for making critical decisions (such as co-operating with further imaging studies) is still missing. However, the patient who is being weaned from ventilatory support may need little or no sedation, and will be able to communicate with a letter board or gestures regarding consent for a tracheostomy. Many patients will have the capacity to make decisions at the time of ICU admission, or when they are receiving high dependency care. It is essential that all reasonable efforts are made to involve such individuals in both present and anticipated future decision-making, and where an assessment shows that lack of capacity makes this impossible, the process of reaching this conclusion needs to be clinically documented.
Assessing capacity
'A person lacks capacity in relation to a matter if at the material time he is unable to make a decision for himself in relation to the matter because of an impairment of, or a disturbance in functioning of, the brain or mind' (MCA section 1(2)) Impaired capacity may be permanent or temporary (eg caused by conditions such as acute renal failure or brain trauma). In all cases assessment must use the two-stage test of capacity.
Stage one: Does the person have an impairment of the mind or brain, or is there some sort of disturbance affecting the way their mind or brain works? (It does not matter whether the impairment or disturbance is temporary or permanent).
Stage two: If capacity is compromised, does that impairment or disturbance mean that the person is unable to make the decision in question at the time it needs to be made?
The Act states that a person is unable to make a decision if they cannot: • understand information about the decision to be made • retain that information in their mind • use or weigh that information as part of the decisionmaking process • communicate their decision.
If, after every effort and support has been given to help a person make a decision for themselves, the answer to the above two stages is 'yes', then it can be determined that a person lacks capacity.
It is important to underline the fact that assessment of capacity is decision specific, and needs to be undertaken by the clinical professional involved in delivery of specific care. Thus, in principle, each member of the team (nurse, physiotherapist, radiographer, dietician, or physician) may need to make judgements regarding capacity and consent before carrying out an intervention. In practice, such assessments are often made in a corporate fashion, and where there is doubt about capacity, responsibility for assessment rests with the senior clinician in charge of the patient. However, assessment of capacity should be a multi-disciplinary process, and the continuing presence of the nurse at the bedside of a critically ill patient provides an enormously useful resource to comprehend patients' wishes. Discussions regarding capacity should be an integral part of the ward rounds and team meetings, and be documented as such, in appropriate patients.
Chapter 3 of the Code of Practice 2 outlines the need to present information in a way that is appropriate to meet individual needs and circumstances, and stresses the importance of explaining information using the most appropriate form of communication for that person. The support provided for such decision-making in critically ill patients will clearly differ from other settings. For example, some approaches, such as moving the patient to a more optimal environment for interaction may be impractical, and repeated interaction to allow for fluctuating capacity may be limited by the need for urgency. Many critically ill patients with capacity (eg when weaning from ventilation) may need special resources and professional skills to communicate their wishes (letter boards, light writers, etc) which may not be particularly common in other settings. Thus, information needs to be presented appropriately to the situation. Within the stressful environment of an intensive care unit, even individuals with capacity may need longer to take in information and understand it. Some individuals may only be able to communicate by blinking or simply moving their little finger, for example. Communicating with patients in these circumstances can be difficult and may require the intervention of professionals with greater expertise and experience (eg physiotherapists, speech therapists, or occupational therapists) to intervene and provide information and ascertain a person' s decision.
The amount and type of information given will be dependent on the decision that needs to be made and the length of time they have to make it. In emergency medical situations urgent decisions may need to be made and action taken in a person' s best interests, in line with Part 1 Section 4 of the Act. In non-urgent situations, it is important to consider the gravity of the decision that needs to be made.
Making unwise decisions
The MCA provides the right of everyone with capacity to make decisions which to others may seem unwise, but this right applies only if the decision-making process is not compromised by lack of capacity. Thus, a confused patient who is recovering from sedation or head injury may pull out a tracheostomy tube and indicate that he does not wish it replaced. Replacement of the tracheostomy tube in this context, even against the apparent wishes of the patient, is appropriate, because the patient lacks capacity and it is in the patient' s best interests, and thus in accordance with the MCA.
However, this needs to be contrasted with situations in critical care where a seemingly unwise decision is based on full comprehension. For example, most neurosurgeons and intensivists may choose to treat a young patient with high spinal cord injury aggressively in the first instance, despite the significant risk of poor recovery and need for long-term ventilation. However, if the patient was not otherwise confused or sedated, and was judged not to have clinically significant depression by a psychiatrist, then it would be for the patient to decide whether to opt for continued ventilatory support and surgery. If the patient refused, he would be making an apparently unwise decision, but given the presence of capacity, one that needed to be respected by the treating team.
One of the key principles of the Act is that any act done for, or any decision made on behalf of a person who lacks capacity must be done, or made, in that person' s best interests. This principle applies regardless of the decision maker or the magnitude of the decision, and covers all aspects of financial, personal welfare and healthcare issues. One exception is where a valid advance decision exists, in which case the person' s explicit wishes override any assessment of best interests. A detailed specification of individual instructions is impossible, but Section 4 of the Act provides general guidelines for the rationale on which such assessments should be based.
However, it is reassuring that in the absence of such advance decisions, Section 5 of the MCA provides a legal framework for acts that need to be carried out in the best interests of persons who lack capacity to make a decision, and thus legitimises care for a critically ill patient who lacks capacity. It is important to note that Section 5 does not provide defence in cases of negligence.
Compliance with the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards 2009
The Mental Health Act (2007) included a provision to amend the MCA by introducing the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DoLS) 3 effective from April 2009. These amendments permit a deprivation of liberty within the defined new 'rules.' The purpose of the DoLS is to protect vulnerable people lacking capacity from being arbitrarily deprived of their liberty and to provide them with a range of safeguards. In the critical care setting this raises a number of issues which need to be considered to ensure that the healthcare team are working lawfully within the MCA. 4 One such issue is that of restraint of patients, specifically dealt with by Section 6 of the MCA. The decision to restrain a person who lacks capacity will only attract protection from liability if the following two conditions are satisfied: • The person taking action must reasonably believe that restraint is necessary to prevent harm to the person who lacks capacity. • The amount or type of restraint used and amount of time it lasts must be a proportionate response to the likelihood and seriousness of harm. If the above two criteria are not satisfied then the clinician is likely to be acting unlawfully and may be sued for assault or reported to their relevant professional body for misconduct.
In the critical care setting, such intervention can take the form of either physical restraints, or more commonly, pharmacological interventions in response to challenging behaviour which represents a risk to the patient or other individuals. It is important to proceed from a starting point that appreciates that inappropriate limitation of an individual' s liberty is unlawful. However, such restraint may be clinically necessary (and justified) in order to deliver the treatment which the clinician has assessed to be in the best interests of the patient. The healthcare team may need to address (and document) the following considerations in such instances: • Intent is important: It is not appropriate to apply the DoLS of the MCA where sedation or other medication is intended to facilitate treatment and not primarily to restrain patients. Thus, the use of sedation to facilitate ventilation in a patient with respiratory failure would not qualify as deprivation of liberty in this context.
• However, the DoLS may (at least in theory) apply, where physical restraint or chemical restraint (with sedatives, tranquilisers, etc) is primarily or partly used to restrain patients. • Under these circumstances, the MCA requires that clinicians choose the least restrictive option that is compatible with ensuring the patients safety (eg using clinical supervision and persuasion rather than physical or chemical restraint, wherever possible). • In practice, the choice of methods used to facilitate clinical care in these circumstances, may depend upon the local availability of potentially limited resources. Although this may provide a context for the decision to use physical or chemical restraint, under-resourced healthcare is not a justifiable defence for excessive use of restraint. • Where measures are being partly or primarily being used for restraint, and a judgement has been made that the chosen method of restraint is most appropriate in the given clinical context (allowing for reasonable considerations of resource allocation) it is appropriate that clinicians seek to work within the framework of the DoLS of the MCA. • These considerations suggest that the DoLS will need to be activated in contexts where sedative agents or major tranquilizers are used in confused and combative patients who are a risk to themselves, staff or other patients. • This is not an infrequent scenario in intensive care units, but formal authorisation under the DoLS is rarely applied for. Given this, it could be argued that many clinicians, units and hospitals are acting illegally in these situations. • This is certainly true in terms of the letter of the law, but a reading of the DoLS, and the examples of case law in the document, suggest that the spirit of the regulations is not relevant to the majority of cases in which physical or pharmacological restraint is used in the ICU setting. For example, in urgent situations, the DoLS permit restraint to be initiated on the basis of consideration of best interests, and authorisation sought for such restraint within seven calendar days of imposing restraint. In practice, restraint beyond seven days is not commonly required in most ICU patients. • Consequently, where needed for clinical care the initial use of restraint is likely to be entirely justifiable under the best interests principle, and clinicians should not withhold such interventions where they are justifiable as being needed for safe care of patients. • A direct application of the DoLS at this stage requires that authorisation for continuing deprivation of liberty needs to be sought, but this is rarely done in most ICUs. Clinicians need to be aware that this practice, though common, is not concordant with the letter of the regulations. Actually applying for authorisation in every such instance would result in a substantial administrative burden, given thẽ 30% incidence of ICU delirium. • It would be wise for ICU clinicians to have a discussion with their hospital management to explicitly recognise this situation, and decide how the organisation wished to deal with these circumstances. • In any case, as a minimum, ICU clinicians should consider applying for formal authorisation in cases where the use of physical or pharmacological restraint is likely to be prolonged, where social or interpersonal issues apply, or where any member of the clinical team feels that a formal authorisation is merited. • Where a decision is made to apply for authorisation under the DoLS, the following considerations must apply: -The patient must be over 18 years of age -The treatment being initiated must not contravene a valid advance decision that is in place, or is contrary to the wishes of an authorised decision maker. -The patient must lack mental capacity (following the capacity test set out in the MCA) in relation to the specific decision to be in the hospital or care home for the purpose of receiving proposed care and/or treatment. -An important distinction needs to be made between patients who are deprived of their liberty because of a non-psychiatric illness (as discussed above) and those detained under the Mental Health Act 1983, as a result of psychiatric illness. The DoLS is not relevant to patients in the latter setting, where a psychiatric opinion is required to detain individuals under the Mental Health Act. • If the above apply to a patient, the clinician caring for that patient should document these and formally seek authorisation for the deprivation of liberty in this setting. The responsibility to seek such authorisation rests with the hospital caring for the patient. The authority that provides such authorisation for hospital patients is usually cited as the Primary Care Trust. However, changes in the organisation of the NHS mean that these bodies will cease to exist, and consequent changes in process remain unclear.
Advance decisions
An advance decision allows a person aged 18 and over, while they still have capacity, to refuse specific medical treatment at a time in the future, when they may lack capacity to consent to or refuse that treatment. Advance decisions can be verbal as well as written. The MCA puts advance decisions on a statutory footing. Although operational at a time when capacity is compromised, advance decisions are made at a time when capacity was present, and hence have the same force in law as refusal of treatment by an individual with capacity. Consequently, healthcare staff are obliged to abide by an advance decision, providing it is valid and applicable to the situation in question and current circumstances. It is important to note that the Act imposes particular safeguards on making advance decisions which refuse life-sustaining treatment. Such advance decisions MUST meet specific requirements:
• Decisions must be in writing.
• The document must include a clear, specific, written statement that the advance decision is to apply to the specific treatment even if life is at risk. • The person must sign the advance decision, but if unable to do so, they can direct someone to sign on their behalf in their presence. • The document must be signed in the presence of a witness. • The witness must sign the document in the presence of the person making the advance decision. • Where the person making the decision is unable to sign the document personally, and directs another individual to do so on his/her behalf, this must be done in the presence of the witness, who must sign the document to indicate that they witnessed the signature by the individual who has been nominated to sign the document. • An advance decision can legitimately specify the refusal of artificial nutrition and hydration. • An advance decision cannot refuse interventions that are needed to keep a person comfortable. • It is recommended that an advance decision to refuse life sustaining treatment(s) be discussed with a healthcare professional, but the absence of such a discussion does not invalidate the document. Where the applicability or validity of an advance decision is in doubt, clinicians should engage and consult with other members of the multidisciplinary team, family members, and any others close to the person, so that everyone has an opportunity to express their views. Such discussions may result in a rational consensus regarding the validity of an advance decision in a given context. However, on occasion, such discussions may highlight disagreements within clinical teams, or between clinical teams and families as to whether or not a given treatment should be initiated. If it is impossible to resolve such disagreements, the case will need to be taken to the Court of Protection. If a clinician has a conscientious objection to the refusal of treatment set out in an advance decision, arrangements should be made as soon as possible to transfer the management of the patient to another healthcare professional.
The Court of Protection and other bodies authorised to make decisions on behalf of a person who lacks capacity
The MCA creates a new court and a new public office to protect people who lack capacity and to supervise and support those making decisions on their behalf. Previously the court only presided over financial matters but has now included health and welfare decisions.
Lasting Power of Attorney (LPA)
An LPA is a person over the age of 18 who has been nominated by an individual (known as the donor) to make decisions on their behalf should they at a later point in time lack capacity. A donor may appoint one or more people to become their attorney (sometimes referred to as the 'donee' in the Act and Code of Practice). The attorney is bound to make decisions in line with the principles of the MCA and must have regard to the Code of Practice. There are two different types of LPAs: • A Personal Welfare LPA is appointed to make decisions about both health and personal welfare. • A Property and Affairs LPA is appointed to make decisions about property and financial matters, but not health and personal welfare. If the LPA grants healthcare decision-making responsibilities to the holder of the LPA, clinicians must treat the holder of the LPA as standing in the shoes of the patient for the purpose of making treatment decisions, and must follow the decisions of the holder of the LPA, unless they are concerned that the holder of the LPA is not acting in the best interests of the patient.
Public Guardian
The Public Guardian is supported by the new Office of the Public Guardian and has many responsibilities including: • maintaining a register of and monitoring LPAs • maintaining a register of orders appointing deputies • supervising deputies appointed by the courts • providing reports to the courts.
The referral mechanisms that are implied in these arrangements are still in their infancy. It may take the Office of the Public Guardian time to provide an opinion in the event of a dispute, but a hearing before a Judge of the Court of Protection can be arranged at very short notice, and individual hospitals should have clearly defined mechanisms for accessing such facilities. Where there is a delay, clinicians will need to continue to rely on their professional judgement when it comes to urgent or emergency decisions in the clinical management of patients. In such settings, it is important to base clinical decision making on good clinical management, to act in the best interests of the patient, and to clearly document the decision making process that resulted in management choices.
Independent Mental Capacity Advocate (IMCA)
Most individuals who lose capacity can have their views represented through the various mechanisms that have been discussed earlier in this document, such as the creation of an LPA, a written advance decision or verbally expressed advance decisions, communicated by family or close friends. However, some individuals lacking capacity may have made no provision to communicate their wishes at a time when they possessed capacity, and may have no family, friends or professional representative (eg a solicitor). The IMCA represents the interests of, and provides support for decision making in such individuals. The duty to instruct an IMCA in these circumstances lies with the staff of NHS organisations caring for the person lacking capacity. The IMCA service itself is independent of these organisations.
The IMCA acquires and integrates all the available information about an individual lacking capacity, in order to best represent and support the person. The pragmatic position to be adopted for involving an IMCA can be found in greater details in the Intensive Care Society document MCA 2005: A Guide for Critical Care Settings. 5
Research in critical care setting
The Act recognises the importance of research in general, and the role of research in advancing the clinical care of patients who suffer from diseases that result in mental incapacity (referred to in some parts of this section as an 'impairing condition'). The Act covers research that: • is intrusive (intrusive research is defined as that which would require consent in an individual with capacity) • involves patients with an impairment of, or disturbance in, the functioning of their brain or mind, which makes them unable to consent for themselves • is not research that involves clinical trials of medicines, as The implications of the MCA on research in the critical care setting will be explored further in a forthcoming paper.
Conclusion
It is important to note that, in most areas, the MCA codifies what is currently best practice, rather than imposing completely new rules, and should therefore not be too onerous to comply with. Indeed, the documentation of these issues in statute and regulation removes ambiguity and provides protection for clinicians dealing with incapacitated patients. The majority of patients who are in Level 3 beds will clearly have compromised capacity due to disease or drugs. In these patients the one major issue will be identifying and following procedures for consent that take account of any wishes or preferences they expressed when they still had capacity. There is a need to have clearer documentation of these processes than has been the case thus far. At a strategic level, this needs to include evidence of formal Trust and Unit protocols and compliance with defined process and procedures. Units also need to ensure that the application of these protocols is clearly documented in the clinical notes of individual patients.
Further and more detailed information about specific issues faced in intensive care can be found on the ICS website. 5 
